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Pakistan's foreign policy, 1958-65 : an examination of contending hypotheses.

Ashraful. Hasan
University of Windsor

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**PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY (1958-65):
AN EXAMINATION OF CONTENDING HYPOTHESES**

**A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies through the
Department of Political Science in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master
of Arts at
The University of Windsor**

by

Ashraful Hasan

**University of Windsor
1979**

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ABSTRACT

This research-work tests, through a content analysis of the major Pakistani newspaper Dawn, various hypotheses dealing with Pakistan's relations with India, the United States, the Soviet Union and China during the 1958-65 period. These hypotheses, advanced by analysts of Pakistan's foreign policy, pertain to the Pakistani fear of the above mentioned states, the determinants of Pakistan's relations with these states and the shifts that occurred in these relations during the period under review.

The thesis is presented in seven chapters. The introductory chapter provides the setting for the study by clearly delineating the hypotheses which are examined in the thesis. In the following chapter, the research method used in the study is explained in detail. The techniques of thematic content analysis were applied to 487 samples of the newspaper Dawn (selected on a weekly basis for the 1958-65 period) to determine the extent and nature of front page and editorial coverage given to India, the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Due to the close links that existed between Dawn and the Pakistani governmental elite during the 1958-65 period, the opinions expressed in Dawn were regarded as being reliable indicators of the perceptions of the governmental elite.

The findings of the study are examined in the subsequent four chapters. It is confirmed that, for most years during the 1958-65

period, the threat from India was perceived by the Pakistani governmental elite to be the main threat. However, the findings do not substantiate the view, popularly expressed by analysts of Pakistan's foreign policy, that the Indian threat was perceived to be the main threat throughout the 1958-65 period.

The low significance of the ideological factor as a determinant of Pakistan's relations with India, the United States, the Soviet Union and China is established by our findings. The thesis also examines the importance of the South Asian policies of these states and their respective policies on the Kashmir issue as determinants of Pakistan's attitude towards them.

A significant finding of this study is that October 1962 was a major turning point in Pakistan's relations with India, and in her alignment pattern with the other three states. From this date onwards, the fear of India rose sharply, a major disillusionment with the United States occurred, the discontent with the Soviet Union declined and Sino-Pakistan relations showed signs of definite improvement.

The thesis concludes with a summary and further integration of the data. An effort is also made in the concluding chapter to suggest possible explanations for the unexpected and inconclusive findings.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>page</u>
Abstract.....	iii
Acknowledgements.....	v
List of Tables.....	vii
Chapter I. Introduction.....	1
II. Research Methods.....	24
III. The India Factor.....	37
IV. Relations with the United States.....	52
V. Relations with the Soviet Union.....	62
VI. Relations with China.....	73
VII. Conclusion.....	82
Appendix 1	89
2	90
Bibliography.....	97
Vita Auctoris.....	102

LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table No.</u>		<u>page</u>
3-1	Percentage of Front Page Stories and Editorials Dealing with the Four Major Powers, by Period.....	38
3-2	Percentage of Front Page Stories and Editorials Dealing with Fear of Armed Attack, by Period.....	40
3-3	Percentage of Front Page Stories and Editorials Dealing with the Fear of Armed Attack from India, by Period.....	42
3-4	Front Page and Editorial Treatment of South Asian Policies of India, by Period.....	43
3-5	Percentage of Front Page Stories and Editorials Dealing with Kashmir, by Period.....	45
3-6	Front Page and Editorial Treatment of Indian Policies Related to Kashmir, by Period.....	46
3-7	Front Page and Editorial Treatment of Indian Policies in South Asia and Non-South Asia, by Period.....	49
4-1	Percentage of Front Page Stories and Editorials Dealing with the United States, by Period.....	53
4-2	Front Page and Editorial Treatment of American Policies Related to Kashmir, by Period.....	55
4-3	Front Page and Editorial Treatment of American Policies in South Asia and Non-South Asia, by Period.	58
5-1	Percentage of Front Page Stories and Editorials Dealing with the Soviet Union, by Period.....	63
5-2	Percentage of Front Page Stories and Editorials Dealing with Fear of Armed Attack from the Soviet Union and India, by Year.....	65
5-3	Percentage of Front Page Stories and Editorials Dealing with Communism, by Period.....	66
5-4	Front Page and Editorial Treatment of Soviet Policies Related to Kashmir, by Period.....	68
5-5	Front Page and Editorial Treatment of Soviet Policies in South Asia and Non-Asia, by Period.....	69

<u>Table No.</u>		<u>page</u>
6-1	Percentage of Front Page Stories and Editorials Dealing with China, by Period.....	74
6-2	Percentage of Front Page Stories and Editorials Dealing with Fear of Armed Attack from China and India, by Year.....	75
6-3	Front Page and Editorial Treatment of China's Policies Related to Kashmir, by Period.....	78
6-4	Front Page and Editorial Treatment of Chinese Policies in South Asia and Non-South Asia, by Period.....	79

Appendix 2 Tables

I	Percentage of Front Page Stories and Editorials Dealing with Four Major Powers, by Period.....	90
II	Percentage of Front Page Stories and Editorials Dealing with Kashmir, by Period.....	91
III	Percentage of Front Page Stories and Editorials Dealing with Communism, by Period.....	92
IV	Percentage of Front Page Stories and Editorials Dealing with Fear of Armed Attack, by Period.....	93
V	Percentage of Front Page Stories and Editorials Dealing with Non-South Asian Policies of Four Major Powers, by Period.....	94
VI	Percentage of Front Page Stories and Editorials Dealing with South-Asian Policies of Four Major Powers, by Period.....	95
VII	Percentage of Front Page Stories and Editorials Dealing with Policies of Four Major Powers Related to Kashmir, by Period.....	96

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Pakistan's relations with India, the United States, the Soviet Union and China underwent much change during the 1958-65 period. The hypotheses formulated by foreign policy analysts to identify and explain these changes are varied in nature and often tend to compete with or even contradict each other. This research effort will attempt to test some of the important hypotheses advanced by these analysts.

The literature surveyed for this study is representative of a fairly wide range of opinions which have been expressed by analysts of Pakistan's foreign policy. Along with the writings of two prominent academics of Pakistani origin, viz. S. M. Burke and G. W. Choudhury,¹ the analysis of Professor N. D. Palmer from the United States was reviewed. Finally, for obtaining an authentic view of the perceptions of the Pakistani governmental elite, we examined the analysis of former

¹G. W. Choudhury has, on various occasions, had the opportunity to observe from close quarters the making of Pakistan's foreign policy. He was a member of Ayub's entourage to the Soviet Union in April 1965.

President Ayub Khan, the chief architect of Pakistan's foreign policy during the 1958-65 period.

Although different interpretations are available on the subject of Pakistan's foreign policy and her external alignments, a common theme which runs through almost all of the literature on Pakistan's foreign policy is the preoccupation of the Pakistani decision-makers with what has been called the "India factor." The "India factor" refers to the Pakistani fear of India and the almost persistent conflict existing between the two states. In South Asia and United States Policy, N. D. Palmer mentions that "relations with India have been the main preoccupation of Pakistan's foreign policy. Its objectives vis-à-vis India have centered on security and defense...."² While elaborating on this theme, Palmer cites a statement made in June 1962 by the former Pakistani Foreign Minister M. A. Bogra in which he clearly indicated that "... the foreign policy of India, in so far as Pakistan is concerned, is aimed at strangulating us."³

In Friends Not Masters, President Ayub also lays major emphasis on India-Pakistan relations, and reiterates the view that Pakistan was mainly concerned with Indian designs against Pakistan's independence.⁴ Ayub describes the Indian foreign policy as being primarily directed

² N. D. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p. 167.

³ Ibid.

⁴ M. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (New York, London, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967).

towards "the isolation of Pakistan and its disintegration"⁵

Much of this Pakistani fear of India, as explained by Ayub, arose due to the reluctance of the Indian leadership to acknowledge the reality of Pakistan. In 1947, Mr. A. Kripalani, President of the Indian National Congress, had declared that, "Neither the Congress nor the nation has given up its claim of a united India."⁶ Similar statements were made by other Indian politicians describing the partition of India as being a temporary phenomenon and expressing the hope that India would eventually be united.

While the general theme of G. W. Choudhury's book, Pakistan's Relations with India,⁷ also revolves around the fear of India and the Pakistani quest for security against possible Indian aggression, the author indicates that the fear of India rose sharply from late 1962 onwards. This increase in the Pakistani fear of India is explained by Choudhury in the context of the massive arms supplied by the United States to India after the outbreak of the Sino-Indian conflict of October 1962. During an emergency session of the National Assembly of Pakistan summoned in November 1962 to discuss the situation arising out of the American decision to arm India, the former Pakistani Foreign Minister M. A. Bogra emphatically stated that "... the present augmentation in Indian military strength

⁵ Ibid., p. 127.

⁶ Ibid., p. 115.

⁷ G. W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India: 1947-66 (London: Pall Mall, 1968).

and warlike stores and the assistance now being extended by our friends to India is going to seriously aggravate the situation against us and to our great disadvantage."⁸ Foreign Minister Bogra's statement, as cited by Choudhury, coupled with the opinions expressed by Ayub and Palmer, leads us to hypothesize that the threat from India was perceived to be the main threat throughout the 1958-65 period, but increased sharply from late 1962 onwards. (Hypothesis 1a)

Although in Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, Burke also lays a major emphasis upon the India factor, he attempts to demonstrate that, in particular periods of time, the India factor was not, in fact, the main concern of Pakistan.⁹ For instance, Burke suggests that the threat from China was/perceived to be a greater threat to Pakistan than the threat from India during the 1959-60 period¹⁰ (Hypothesis 1b). Elaborating on this theme, Burke refers to Ayub's proposal for joint-defence made to India in a public proclamation on 24 April 1959¹¹, after the Chinese action in Tibet. The joint-defence proposal is interpreted by Burke as an indication that, in the 1959-60 period, the Pakistani governmental elite was more concerned about the threat from China, and felt that it was in the mutual interest of both India and Pakistan

⁸ Ibid., pp. 268-269.

⁹ S. M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 216.

¹¹ Ibid.

to cooperate with each other and jointly deal with any possible Chinese aggression.

However, some doubt is created about Burke's interpretation of the joint-defence proposal, if we read the analysis of the very person who made the proposal, viz. Ayub Khan. In Friends Not Masters, Ayub touches upon this subject in some detail and explains that:

What I had in mind was a general understanding for peace between the two countries. I emphasized that the pre-requisites for such an understanding was the solution of big problems like Kashmir and the canal problems. Once they were resolved, the armies of the two countries could disengage and move to their respective vulnerable frontiers. This would give us the substance of joint-defence; that is freedom from fear of each other and freedom to protect our respective frontiers.¹²

Although the Chinese action in Tibet may have caused some concern among the Pakistani governmental elite, Ayub's interpretation of the proposal, as presented in his autobiography, provides no indication of a Pakistani perception of a threat from China.¹³ In fact, it is illustrative of the basic Pakistani approach to her relations with India. The emphasis was upon seeking a solution of the outstanding issues between the two countries as a prerequisite for any normalisation of relations. The 1959-60 period did witness a greater Indian receptivity to this Pakistani demand due to India's

¹² Ayub Khan, op. cit., p. 127.

¹³ It may be worthwhile noting that since Sino-Pak relations were extremely cordial in the mid-sixties, Ayub could hardly be expected to admit in his autobiography, published in 1967, that Pakistan feared China in 1959.

realisation that, in the face of possible Chinese aggression in India, it was in her best national interests not to antagonise Pakistan at this stage. Such an Indian outlook facilitated the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty on 19 September 1960 -- thus leading to a general decrease in tension in Indo-Pakistan relations. Notwithstanding this trend in relations between the two countries, Ayub does not extend the argument as far as Burke to suggest that in the 1959-60 period, China posed a greater threat to Pakistan than India.

Although, as we have seen, some controversy does exist among foreign policy analysts over the Pakistani perception of a threat from China during the 1959-60 period, the United States has not been portrayed in the writings of any of the authors reviewed as having posed an armed threat to Pakistan in any phase of the 1958-65 period. Since the United States had never been known to have entertained ambitions of a military intervention in the South Asian region, the non-perception of a threat from the United States is quite understandable. Given the controversial nature of the perceived Chinese threat during the 1959-60 period, it would be useful to test against Hypothesis 1b the hypothesis that the threat to Pakistan from China and the United States was consistently perceived to be non-existent. (Hypothesis 1c) ,

Burke's historical narration of Pakistani-Soviet relations also suggests that Pakistan perceived a threat from the Soviet Union during a particular phase of the 1958-65 period. While explaining the implications of the 1959 Chinese action in Tibet for Pakistan's

perception of external threat, Burke comments that, "Pakistan, ... had hitherto viewed Russia as the chief danger to the peace of South Asia...."¹⁴ In other words, the Pakistani governmental elite felt that the Soviet policies towards South Asia posed a threat to Pakistan and endangered the peace of the region. The Soviet Union had, from the outset, been very sceptical of the motivations behind the partition of India and regarded it as a device adopted by the British to perpetuate Western control in the region.¹⁵ Since the Muslims in the subcontinent were at the forefront in demanding partition, Pakistan became the major target of Soviet criticism in the post-1947 period. She was regarded as a handy tool of the "Western imperialists" -- a notion which, the Soviet Union felt, was more than confirmed by the definite Pakistani alignment with the Western bloc in the mid-fifties. Thereafter, the Soviet Union became more distinctly anti-Pakistan¹⁶ -- a stance which contributed to Pakistan's perception of a possible threat from the Soviet Union.

The Pakistani fear of the Soviet Union was heightened after the shooting down of the American U-2 spy plane in May 1960. Moscow was critical of Pakistan's policy of allowing American bases in Pakistan, and held her responsible for assisting in the American spying mission over the Soviet Union. In reply to Pakistani assertions

¹⁴ Burke, op. cit., p. 216.

¹⁵ For a brief summary of the Soviet reaction to the creation of Pakistan, see ibid., pp. 97-98.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 208.

that they had no knowledge of the spying mission, the Soviet Premier cautioned that "they ought to know for their own good, because they might be the sufferers of the Americans' playing with fire."¹⁷ The threat from the Soviet Union was only too clear to the Pakistani governmental elite.

Burke indicates, however, that in the wake of this incident Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union somewhat improved. Following fresh efforts made by Ayub to improve relations with Moscow, a Pak-Soviet agreement for economic aid and technical assistance for oil exploration to Pakistan was finalised on 4 March 1961. This agreement, according to Burke, indicated that "the ice was broken" in Pak-Soviet relations, and in the subsequent years, there was a gradual improvement in relations between the two countries.¹⁸

Although Burke does emphasize the Pakistani perception of a threat from the Soviet Union prior to 1961, he does not, at any stage, suggest that the Soviet threat was greater than the Indian threat (as he does in the case of the "Chinese threat" during the 1959-60 period). In other words, Burke maintains that the threat to Pakistan from the Soviet Union was perceived to be significant until at least 1961, but was consistently perceived as being secondary to the Indian threat.¹⁹ (Hypothesis 1d)

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 195.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 213.

¹⁹ For Burke's interpretation of Soviet-Pakistani relations prior to 1961, see ibid., pp. 208-213.

Burke also lays a great emphasis on the implications of ideology for Pakistan's foreign policy alignments. According to Burke, ideological factors played a significant role in shaping Pakistan's foreign policy alignments until 1962, but subsequently declined in importance.²⁰ (Hypothesis 2) Reference is made by Burke to

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's proposal of 12 April 1950 that the United States should provide territorial guarantees to both India and Pakistan to allow them to spend more on economic development "which would keep out the potential menace of Communism."²¹ That the ideology of the Soviet Union and China, viz. Communism did not find much favour among the Pakistani governmental elite is clearly demonstrated, according to Burke, by two points. First, a ban was imposed on the Communist Party in Pakistan as early as 1954. Secondly, in his autobiography published in 1967, long after the process of normalisation of relations with the Communist countries had begun, Ayub referred to Communism as a "panacea for an acutely diseased society."²² Such a line of argument is extended further by Burke to suggest that ideological factors affected Pakistan's priorities in the sphere of foreign policy and contributed to a Pakistani preference for the Western countries. Pakistan, with its Islamic traditions, felt somewhat closer to the Christian West vis-a-vis the atheistic Soviet Union.²³

²⁰ Ibid., p. 91.

²¹ Ibid., p. 92.

²² Ibid., p. 93.

²³ Ibid., pp. 94-95.

Other writers have presented evidence which contradicts Burke's assertion. For instance, Arif Hussain in Pakistan: Its Ideology and Foreign Policy, cites the former Pakistani Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon's statement in the Assembly on 8 March 1958, in which he made the point that:

... the Muslim will enter the Communist camp rather than remain under Hindu domination. If the democracies of America and Europe do not solve the problems of the freedom of Kashmir, Kashmiris will talk to the Communist camp.²⁴

The evidence provided by Arif suggests that pragmatism and rational self-interest, rather than purely ideological considerations, were instrumental in shaping Pakistan's foreign policy alignments. Ideological considerations did not, according to Arif, play a prominent role in determining Pakistan's alignment pattern at any stage.²⁵

Some credence may be given to Arif's contention in the light of Burke's own acknowledgement that in spite of Pakistan's dislike of Communism, she always regarded India as being enemy number one.²⁶ In the event of a Communist attack, Pakistan was convinced that the United States would, in any case, assist her as part of her overall containment policy. But in the case of a confrontation with India, Pakistan did not feel too assured of American assistance.

²⁴ Arif Hussain, Pakistan: Its Ideology and Foreign Policy (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1966), p. 99.

²⁵ For details, see ibid., pp. 89-113.

²⁶ Burke, op. cit., p. 94.

It is to be noted that the principal controversy between the two schools of thought over the role of ideology in shaping Pakistan's foreign policy alignments relates to the period down to 1962. The guide-post of Pakistan's foreign policy in the post-1962 period, as explained by Burke, was one of "... friendship with all, irrespective of differences in ideology and social systems."²⁷ Such a philosophy was aimed at maximising Pakistan's security against possible Indian aggression, and had a very low (if not null) content of ideological motivations.

The significance attached by the Pakistani governmental elite to the India factor, as clearly manifest in the analysis of Palmer, Ayub Khan and Choudhury (and up to a point, even Burke) leads us to expect that the desirability or undesirability of maintaining relations with the Soviet Union, China and the United States would much depend upon their respective attitudes towards the South Asian region and their receptivity to Pakistan's security needs in her conflict with India. In other words, we can hypothesize that the respective policies of the Soviet Union, China and the United States towards South Asia played a major part in determining Pakistan's attitudes towards these states. (Hypothesis 3)

Within the South Asian region, the Kashmir issue was one of the major Pakistani concerns, and contributed significantly to the process of straining relations between India and Pakistan. The state of Kashmir

²⁷ Ibid., p. 91.

is situated such that, if in the control of a hostile power like India, the defences of West Pakistan could be seriously undermined. Also, the economic life of West Pakistan depended much on the waters of the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum, which could be controlled from the Kashmir region. The significance attached by the Pakistani governmental elite to the Kashmir problem is apparent from Ayub's note of 2 January 1963 to President Kennedy. Expressing concern over the increasing Indian military power, Ayub wrote in his letter that, "only a speedy and just Kashmir settlement can give us any assurance that the contemplated increase of India's military power is not likely to be deployed against Pakistan in future."²⁸ Pakistan had also gone to war with India over the Kashmir issue on two occasions -- once in 1948, after the "tribal invasion" of October 1947, and again in September 1965. It is apparent that the Pakistani governmental elite linked Pakistan's security needs against India largely to a satisfactory solution of the Kashmir problem. We could therefore hypothesize that the Kashmir factor - the respective policies of the Soviet Union, China and the United States on the Kashmir problem - played a major part in determining Pakistan's attitudes towards these states. (Hypothesis 3a).

The general trend of Soviet policies towards South Asia down to 1961 has been discussed at an earlier stage. Although, as mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union had always doubted the wisdom of Pakistan's creation, the pro-Indian bias in Soviet policies became clearly manifest only after Pakistan's membership in the Western alliance system in

²⁸ Ayub Khan, op. cit., p. 150.

the mid-fifties. During a visit by First Secretary Khrushchev and Premier Bulganin to India in November-December 1955, Khrushchev declared that Kashmir was one of the states of India.²⁹ And, on 20 February 1957, the Soviet Union, contrary to her earlier policy of abstaining during a vote on Kashmir at the Security Council, cast a veto on the Kashmir issue.³⁰ This caused much consternation in Pakistan -- and dampened any hopes of a possible improvement of Pakistan's relations with Moscow in the near future. The situation was further aggravated by the U-2 incident of May 1960.

The Chinese policy in the fifties towards South Asia, though not one of support for Pakistan's alignment with the West, was not as critical of Pakistan as was the Soviet policy. On September 23, 1954 Chou expressed his criticism of the S.E.A.T.O. alliance, but also mentioned that the Chinese policy of peaceful coexistence was applicable to all Asian states, including Pakistan.³¹ On the Kashmir issue also, the Chinese adopted a more neutral policy as compared with the Russians. Although the Indians had felt that they had China's support on the Kashmir issue, Chou commented at a press conference in Calcutta in December 1956 that "The Kashmir question is an outstanding question between India and Pakistan."³² Also, during the 1960 Sino-Indian

²⁹ Burke, op. cit., p. 209.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 210.

³¹ Ibid., p. 214.

³² Ibid., p. 217.

boundary talks, China refused to discuss the boundary between China's Sinkiang province and Kashmir because of the disputed nature of the Kashmir region.³³ It is thus clear that the Chinese policies towards South Asia and Kashmir contained the basic ingredients for a future development of closer relations between China and Pakistan.

The American policy in the South Asian region from the late fifties to the mid-sixties, as interpreted by Choudhury, was primarily aimed at winning India's goodwill and friendship. Since Nehru and Mao were regarded by the West as the only alternatives in Asia, the American preference for India vis-a-vis Pakistan was part of the overall American objective of containing China.³⁴ Such an American policy orientation in South Asia could hardly be expected to be compatible with the Pakistani effort to enhance her security against possible Indian aggression. The United States had clearly indicated that her commitments to Pakistan under SEATO and CENTO related only to Communist aggression.³⁵ This, in essence, meant that Pakistan would get no American assistance against possible Indian aggression stemming from her membership of these two alliances.

Given this basic contradiction in objectives, murmurs of dissatisfaction with the United States were heard within Pakistani government

³³ Ibid., p. 218.

³⁴ Choudhury, op. cit., p. 251.

³⁵ Burke, op. cit., p. 167, p. 171.

circles not long after Pakistan had joined these American-sponsored alliances in the mid-fifties. In March 1958, the pro-West Prime Minister, Firoz Khan Noon cautioned the West that if Pakistan's freedom was threatened by India, Pakistan would "... break all pacts and shake hands with people whom we made enemies because of others."³⁶

Following Ayub's coming to power in October 1958, a fresh effort was made by him to consolidate Pakistan's relations with the United States and thereby enhance Pakistan's security interests against India. In March 1959, an agreement of cooperation for security and defence was signed between Pakistan and the United States. This agreement contained clear provisions for the defence and security of Pakistan, and was not limited to instances of Communist aggression.³⁷

Subsequent events, however, showed that notwithstanding Ayub's efforts to forge closer relations with the United States, the American preference for India remained unaffected. In India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers, Choudhury explains how the American policies on Kashmir adversely affected Pakistan's interests.³⁸ Although in January 1948, the United States had favoured the idea of a U.N.-sponsored plebiscite,³⁹ she was not willing to pressure India to agree to the implementation of such a plebiscite. During the July 1961 Ayub-Kennedy

³⁶ Ibid., p. 258.

³⁷ Choudhury, op. cit., p. 251.

³⁸ G. W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent (New York: The Free Press, 1975).

³⁹ Ibid., p. 76.

talks, Kennedy was reluctant to agree to Ayub's proposal that the United States apply pressure on India to settle the Kashmir problem by making the American economic aid programme to India conditional to such a settlement.⁴⁰ All that was achieved during this visit was a vague reference in the joint communique of 13 July 1961 that President Kennedy desired "to see a satisfactory solution of the Kashmir problem and expressed his hope that progress towards a settlement would be possible at an early date."⁴¹

While such American policies in South Asia could hardly be regarded as satisfactory by the Pakistani governmental elite, the literature reviewed suggests that from late 1962 onwards, American policies in South Asia underwent a major change, and to Pakistan's disadvantage.

On 8 September 1962, Chinese forces had crossed the Thagla ridge, which was claimed by India, and on 12 October 1962, Nehru made a public declaration ordering the Indian army to evict the Chinese from Indian territory.⁴² The United States responded to this situation in South Asia by supporting India morally and also with massive military aid. The first consignment of American arms to India reached Calcutta on 3 November 1962.

During the aftermath of the Sino-Indian confrontation, the United

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 104.

⁴¹Cited in ibid., p. 105.

⁴²Burke, op. cit., p. 238.

States made no secret of its priorities in the South Asian region. On 28 December 1962, the U.S. ambassador, Galbraith, while addressing a press conference in Delhi, clearly stated that the American assistance to India was "in no way contingent on an India-Pakistan agreement on the Kashmir problem."⁴³ Such an American attitude created much concern among the Pakistani governmental elite. In a letter to the British Prime Minister, Macmillan, Ayub wrote that, "the extent of military assistance which Britain and the United States have decided to extend to India for the present without making it contingent on a Kashmir settlement, gives us cause for great concern."⁴⁴

In Friends Not Masters, Ayub clearly indicates that the U.S. arms aid to India in late 1962 was followed by a major Pakistani disillusionment with the United States. (Hypothesis 3b) The supply of direct military aid to India, as interpreted by Ayub, implied that the last vestiges of difference between ally Pakistan and non-aligned India had disappeared before the eyes of the American leadership.⁴⁵ The Pakistani government elite also realized that in the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan, "it was most unlikely" that the United States would assist Pakistan.⁴⁶

In Pakistan's Foreign Policy, Burke endorses Ayub's view that the American arms aid to India in late 1962 was followed by a major

⁴³Ibid., p. 286.

⁴⁴Ayub Khan, op. cit., p. 151.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 133.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 153.

Pakistani disillusionment with the United States.⁴⁷ Burke also maintains that the increasing disillusionment with the United States and her policies in South Asia was accompanied by an improvement in Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union and China. (Hypothesis 3c) According to Burke's analysis, a new and improved Pakistani relationship with the Soviet Union and China emerged from late 1962 onwards.⁴⁸

Although Burke emphasizes 1962 as being the major turning point in Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union and China, he acknowledges that a limited improvement in Pakistan's relations with these two countries had occurred as early as 1961. In March 1961, the Pak-Soviet agreement for oil exploration and technical assistance had been signed. Earlier on 15 January 1961, the Pakistani Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir had announced that China had agreed to the demarcation of her boundaries with Pakistan.⁴⁹ Also, in December 1961, Pakistan had voted in the United Nations in favour of considering the proposal for Peking's entry into the world body. This was in contrast to her earlier policy of voting in the United Nations in favour of the American-sponsored resolutions on the China issue, and thus indicated some degree of rapproachment in Sino-Pak relations.⁵⁰ In spite of such a breakthrough in Pakistan's relations

⁴⁷ Burke, op. cit., pp. 288-289.

⁴⁸ For details, see ibid., pp. 290-303.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 290-291.

⁵⁰ Arif Hussain, op. cit., p. 104.

with Moscow and Peking, the Soviet Union continued to support the Indian stand on Kashmir and the Chinese policy on this issue remained as one of neutrality in the period preceding October 1962.⁵¹

In Burke's view, Pakistan's relations with both China and the Soviet Union experienced a definite improvement in the period following the Sino-Indian confrontation of October 1962. As part of the improving Sino-Pakistani relationship, several agreements were signed between the two countries. Prominent amongst these was the signing of the border agreement between China and Pakistan. The border talks between the two sides had begun on 12 October 1962,⁵² and the agreement was signed on 2 March 1963. Since earlier in 1960, China had refused to discuss with India the Sinkiang-Kashmir boundary due to the disputed nature of the Kashmir region, such an agreement was tacitly in favour of the Pakistani position on Kashmir. Pakistan and China also signed a trade agreement on 5 January 1963, an air-transport agreement on 29 August 1963 and a barter-trade agreement in September 1963.⁵³ Explaining this improvement in Sino-Pakistani relations, Choudhury comments that, "Pressed by India and disillusioned with her allies, Pakistan during 1963 edged her way towards closer relations with China."⁵⁴

⁵¹Burke, op. cit., p. 294, p. 300.

⁵²It is interesting to note that on this same date Nehru had ordered the Indian forces to evict the Chinese from Indian territory.

⁵³For details on the Sino-Pak agreements, see Burke, op. cit., pp. 292-293.

⁵⁴Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India, p. 275.

In keeping with the improving Sino-Pakistani relations, China subsequently adopted an attitude towards the Kashmir problem which was overtly in favour of Pakistan's stand on this issue. The joint-communiqué issued at the conclusion of Chou's visit to Pakistan in February 1964 emphasized the hope that Kashmir problem would be settled according to the wishes of the people.⁵⁵

The process of normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union also gathered momentum. In August 1963, a Soviet loan of eleven million pounds sterling to Pakistan was negotiated. This was followed by the signing of an air-transport agreement on 7 October 1963 which permitted for the first time a foreign airline to operate through Moscow to points beyond.⁵⁶ A further Soviet loan to Pakistan worth Rupees fifteen million, was announced in August 1965.⁵⁷

The improving Pak-Soviet relations also manifested itself in a changed Soviet attitude towards the Kashmir problem. Unlike her earlier policy, which was distinctly pro-Indian, the Soviet policy gradually became one which was more tolerant of the Pakistani viewpoint on Kashmir. On 13 May 1964, the Soviet delegate at the Security Council, though formally reaffirming the earlier Soviet stand on Kashmir -- that the Kashmir issue had already been decided by the

⁵⁵ Burke, op. cit., p. 294.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 300.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

people of Kashmir -- emphasized the need to have the "dispute" settled by peaceful means. This statement, though containing an inherent contradiction, indicated the Soviet recognition of the existence of a dispute between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region.⁵⁸

The altered pattern of Pakistan's relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and China was confirmed by subsequent events in 1965. During the Indo-Pakistani war of September 1965, China openly supported Pakistan. On 16 September 1965, after the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan, China issued an ultimatum to India to dismantle her military installations on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim border.⁵⁹ Such a Chinese ultimatum was clearly in Pakistan's favour, as it indicated to the Indians the possibility of a Chinese intervention on the side of Pakistan.

Prior to the Chinese ultimatum, the United States had responded to the crisis in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent in a manner which, for all practical purposes, was to the detriment of Pakistan's interests. Reports indicated that Washington held Pakistan responsible for provoking the crisis.⁶⁰ On 8 September 1965, the United States imposed an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan. This was

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 300-301.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 339.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 341. For details, see Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, p. 121.

followed by the statement of 9 September 1965, issued by the State Department, declaring American neutrality in the Indo-Pakistan conflict.⁶¹ Since, unlike India, Pakistan relied largely upon American armaments, the policy of "neutrality" and the arms embargo were clearly more damaging to Pakistan.

However, as Burke explains, the Chinese ultimatum of 16 September created some American concern over possible Chinese intervention. Fearing an increasing Chinese influence in the region, the American ambassador, Arthur Goldberg described the Kashmir dispute as being "the most serious problem" at the United Nations and in the world.⁶² But the United States did not go any further in "supporting" Pakistan, and it was very doubtful if Pakistan, being an ally of the United States (at least formally), could have been satisfied by mere statements.

Akin to the United States, the Soviet Union adopted a policy of neutrality in the Indo-Pakistan conflict of September 1965. This was, however, a marked shift from the earlier pro-Indian policies of Moscow -- thus indicating an improvement in Pak-Soviet relations. The Soviet policy of neutrality was again manifest at the Tashkent Conference (4-10 January 1966) convened by the Soviet Union to assist in finding a solution to the Indo-Pakistani disputes.⁶³

⁶¹Burke, op. cit., p. 341.

⁶²Ibid., p. 341.

⁶³For details, see ibid., pp. 349-353.

Thus, by early 1966, it had become amply clear to the Pakistani governmental elite that scraps of paper, known as military alliances, were often not worth the material on which they were written on, and that the national interests of Pakistan were better served by a policy of maintaining an equidistance from the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. Such an alignment pattern was thus maintained by Pakistan in the post-1965 period.

CHAPTER II

RESEARCH METHODS

There is no lack of purely descriptive material on Pakistan's foreign policy. This study, however, attempts to analyse trends in Pakistan's foreign policy by the use of content analysis methods.¹

¹ Content analysis has been defined by Holsti as being "... any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages." See O. R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), p. 14. Content analysis as a tool for political research, existed in primitive form during the 1930s. Column inches or occasionally word counts were used for comparing patterns of attention given by a certain newspaper to political events over time or to contrast political interest in large metropolitan dailies with that in small town weeklies. Harold D. Lasswell and his colleagues, Daniel Lerner and Ithiel de Sola Pool made a significant contribution to the development of content analysis as a tool for comparative political research by publishing in 1952 their study of attention patterns in the "prestige papers" of five countries. Since then content analysis has been used by various researchers for conducting cross-national studies. In recent years, technological developments and special computer programmes have furthered the development of content analysis as a tool of research for political scientists. For a brief historical account of the development of content analysis techniques, see B. L. Smith et al., Political Research Methods: Foundations and Techniques (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976), pp. 205-210; R. L. Merritt, Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1970), p. 64.

While such methods have been used by various researchers to study foreign policy trends in other countries,² this marks the first attempt (at least known to the author) of the use of content analysis in the study of Pakistan's foreign policy.

This thesis will examine, through a content analysis of the major Pakistani newspaper Dawn, the various hypotheses dealing with Pakistan's relations with India, the United States, the Soviet Union and China.

The assumptions implicit in this use of content analysis methods is that an examination of the contents of a country's leading newspaper provides the researcher with a substantial understanding of the perceptions held by the national governmental elite of the country's external relations. Shifts in the percentage of press approvals or disapprovals of other states are thus considered to be valid indicators

²See for example, L. D. Dillon, B. Burton, W. C. Soderlund, "Who Was the Principal Enemy?: Shifts in Official Chinese Perceptions of the Superpowers, 1968-69," Asian Survey, XXVII, 5 (May, 1977), pp. 456-473; Kuang-sheng Liao, Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Press Perceptions of Threat: The U.S. and India, 1962," China Quarterly, vol. 53 (January/March, 1973), pp. 80-97; R. C. Angell, V. S. Dunham, J. D. Singer, "Social Values and Foreign Policy Attitudes of Soviet and American Elites," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 8, no. 4 (December, 1964), pp. 329-491. Political scientists have also used content analysis for various other purposes. It has, among other uses, been employed to assess the impact of constituency on legislative behaviour, to determine certain variables underlying belligerent behaviour, and to assess the relative importance of role and personality variables in explaining the behaviour of American Senators. However, within political science, the most extensive use of content analysis has been in the field of international relations. For further details and bibliographical references, see Smith et al., Political Research Methods, pp. 207-208, 210.

of a change in the governmental elites' attitude towards these states.³ To the extent that the press is controlled by the government, or there is a complementarity between the press elites and government elites, such an assumption is valid.

In this study, front page stories and editorials of the newspaper Dawn published in Karachi, Pakistan were reviewed. Dawn is one of the oldest and most reputed newspapers of Pakistan. It was founded in 1942 by M. A. Jinnah, the creator of Pakistan, and served as the organ of the Muslim League, which spearheaded the Pakistan movement.⁴ Hence, from the very outset, a close association existed between Dawn and the Pakistani governmental elite.

During the 1958-65 period, a considerable degree of complementarity continued to exist between the Dawn management and the government. This is clear from some of the authoritative comments on Dawn. For example, the Area Handbook for Pakistan contains the following information: "Edited by Altaf Hussain, a former representative to the United Nations, it [Dawn] tends to support President Ayub Khan."⁵ Commentators like J. C. Merrill, C. R. Bryan and

³ Past researchers, using content analysis techniques, are known to have based their studies on such assumptions. For example, see article written by L. D. Dillon and others, cited in footnote 2 above.

⁴ Sharif Al-Mujahid, "The English Press in Pakistan," Pakistan Quarterly, vol. VI, no. 2 (Summer, 1956), p. 39.

⁵ Area Handbook for Pakistan (Washington: The American University, 1965), p. 307.

Marvin Alisky went even further by describing Dawn as being "the semi-official spokesman of the government."⁶

Strict government controls of the press during the 1958-65 period also ensured that the opinions expressed in Dawn (as in other Pakistani newspapers) conformed with the government viewpoint. Till June 1962, Martial Law remained in force in Pakistan, thus excluding the possibility of viewpoints contrary to that of the government appearing in the Pakistani press. Soon after coming to power in October 1958, Ayub demonstrated his determination to make the press conform with the government's views. In December 1958, the editor of the militant Pakistan Times was arrested. The newspaper was taken over by the Government and later sold to a Lahore city official; afterwards Pakistan Times gave broad support to the government.⁷

Although Martial Law was lifted in June 1962, the press in Pakistan continued to remain largely under Government control. In September 1963, the Press and Publications Ordinance, providing the Government with additional powers of control, was promulgated.⁸

⁶J. C. Merrill, C. R. Bryan, M. Alisky, The Foreign Press: A Survey of the World's Journalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), p. 266.

⁷Area Handbook for Pakistan, p. 307.

⁸For details see E. L. Sommerlad, The Press in Developing Countries (Melbourne: Sydney University Press, 1966), p. 19.

The government also exerted pressures on the Press by threatening a withdrawal of government advertising to dissenting newspapers. Since newspapers in Pakistan relied heavily on government advertising, this served as an effective method to make the press in Pakistan conform with the government viewpoints on foreign relations and on other matters.⁹

The strict government control of the Pakistani press during the 1958-65 period, coupled with the identification that is generally established between the Dawn management and the government, leads us to conclude that the opinions expressed in Dawn would largely reflect the views of the governmental elite in Pakistan.

Due to the journalistic style of Dawn, thematic analysis, rather than symbol analysis, was relied upon in this research design. The use of symbol analysis is desirable when the media tends to use particular symbols of approval or disapproval consistently. This is true in the case of publications like the Peking Review. Terms like "paper tigers", "reactionaries", "neocolonialists" have been almost ritualistically used in the Peking Review to express disapproval. However, since Dawn tends to use a variety of terms to express sentiments of approval or disapproval, it was deemed advisable to rely upon thematic analysis.

⁹For some more detail see D. P. Singhal, Pakistan (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972), p. 103, and Sommerlad, op. cit., pp. 153-154.

PREPARATION OF CODE SHEET AND DEVELOPMENT OF THEMES

After having initially reviewed a few samples of Dawn, and keeping in mind the hypotheses developed in Chapter 1, a code-sheet was prepared. In addition to the item dealing with the attention paid to India, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, and to matters related to these four countries such as Kashmir, N.A.T.O., Baghdad Pact, S.E.A.T.O., Communist activities within Pakistan, and Communist activities outside Pakistan, the code-sheet contained four major themes.

The first theme, after the attention factor, dealt with the expressed fear of India, the United States, the Soviet Union and China. The remaining three themes on the code-sheet were related to the internal policies of these four countries, and their foreign policies in non-South Asia and in South Asia, respectively. The non-South Asian policies of these states were coded separately in order to ensure adequate testing of Hypothesis 3, which emphasizes the importance of their South Asian policies in explaining Pakistan's attitude towards them. The ideology of these states, which is relevant to Hypothesis 2, and also to an analysis of Pakistan's attitude towards India, was included as a sub-category of the themes dealing with the internal policies,¹⁰ non-South Asian policies and

¹⁰ It is worthwhile noting that none of the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 1 were concerned with the internal policies per se. However, since some of the coverage given to the domestic policies of the four countries dealt with their respective ideologies, the inclusion of a theme relating to the internal policies was deemed essential.

South Asian policies of these four countries. The theme concerning the foreign policies of these states in South Asia contained an additional sub-category dealing with their policies on the Kashmir issue. Such a sub-category was required to test Hypothesis 3a and to determine the implications of the Kashmir dispute on the overall Indo-Pakistan relations.

Although front page stories and editorials were coded for attention paid to N.A.T.O., Baghdad Pact, and S.E.A.T.O., the data collected, due to its relatively limited size and low utility for purposes of hypotheses-testing, was later excluded from the analysis.

Certain key concepts and specialised terms were used in the themes developed and in the code-sheet. These are explained below.

Key Concepts

1. Attention: The "attention" given to a particular event or country implies the amount of significance attached to that particular country or event. It reveals also a certain degree of interest in the particular event or country. Thus the greater the "attention" paid to a country B by another country A, the more vital or of greater importance is the country B to the national interests of country A (or, at least, is perceived as being so by country A). The research method which was adopted relied exclusively on frequency counts as an indicator of the intensity of attention. Hence, the greater the frequency of themes related to a particular country,

the greater would be the "attention" being paid to that country.

In addition to front page stories and editorials, photographs appearing on the front page were coded for attention. Late news was included, but cartoons were excluded.

2. Approval: By "approval" is meant the expression of support for or praise of a certain policy of a state. It may also take the form of admiration (or ratification) of a certain policy of a particular state. In broad terms, it is symbolic of a positive attitude towards a particular country and its policies.

3. Disapproval: By "disapproval" is meant the expression of an opinion which is unfavourable towards a certain country or its policies. It may take the form of a rejection of or expression of disappointment over the adoption of a certain policy by a particular country. In broad terms, it is symbolic of a negative attitude towards a particular country and its policies.

4. Neutral: A "neutral" stance is one which does not contain any normative connotation. For instance, a mere reference to the Indian policy of increased cooperation with Australia would be classified as a neutral coverage of the non-South Asian policy of India. It is symbolic of a disengaged attitude of the newspaper towards the policies of the country in question.

In order to differentiate such neutral coverage of the policies of India, the United States, the Soviet Union and China from expressions of approval and disapproval, the term "concerned

attention" will be used in the subsequent chapters. "Concerned attention" thus refers to both expressions of approval and disapproval.

Terms Used in Themes

1. Armed attack/Fear of armed attack:¹¹ References to mobilisation of troops, activities by one state which were perceived as posing a military threat to Pakistan's security and sovereignty, or references to direct armed confrontations between Pakistan and another state were included in this category. Border skirmishes, unless they were very minor and creating no Pakistani concern, were included in this category.
2. Internal policy and foreign policy: The internal policy of a state is one which is clearly dealing with the domestic affairs of that country. On the other hand, the foreign policy of a country is concerned with the direction of its relations with other sovereign states.
3. South Asia: This includes India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka.
4. Ideology: Although, in general terms, "ideology" means the philosophy which governs the operation of the affairs of a state, the term was somewhat differently applied in the case of each of

¹¹The term "threat" has been used in the hypothesis synonymously to the term "fear of armed attack" in the code-sheet.

the four countries, India, the United States, the Soviet Union and China. In the case of the Soviet Union and China, direct references to Soviet and Chinese Communism were treated as themes dealing with the Soviet ideology and the Chinese ideology respectively. In the case of the United States, themes dealing with capitalism or democracy, and clearly linking these concepts to the United States, were treated as instances of themes dealing with the ideology of the United States. The term "ideology" in the context of India was somewhat loosely applied. Front page stories and editorials dealing with either Indian secularism, or Hinduism or the implications of both of these on the treatment of Indian Muslims were treated as instances of a coverage by Dawn of the Indian ideology.

Reliability of Coding Method: In order to ensure the reliability of the coding, a coding-reliability test was conducted prior to the actual process of coding. Three persons acquainted with the techniques of coding and having a basic idea of the South Asian region were requested to code the first page stories and editorials of a sample of Dawn for their thematic content. The reliability of the coding method was ascertained by observing the variation in the coding results of the three coders. Due to the variation in results being greater than 20% in the first test for inter-coder reliability, the code-sheet format was changed to increase the reliability of coding. Inter-coder reliability was thereby obtained at 90%.

Having obtained a satisfactory format for the code sheet, front page stories and editorials of Dawn were reviewed on a six-day basis (one newspaper reviewed for every six days) to obtain a count of front page stories and editorials dealing with India, China, the United States and the Soviet Union. A total of 487 samples of Dawn were reviewed for the 1958-65 period. This sample yielded data on 3110 front page stories and 168 editorials, which we shall analyse separately.

SELECTION OF TIME SPAN AND PERIODISATION OF DATA

The time span of the study is 1958 through 1965. By restricting the study to this eight year period, rather than attempting to look at the entire period since Pakistan's creation in 1947, it was ensured that the raw data obtained was manageable, in terms of magnitude. Also, the 1958-65 period appeared particularly significant in Pakistan's alignment pattern. It was only after a stable government was established in Pakistan by Ayub in October 1958, that the Pakistani governmental elite made major reappraisals of their external alignment pattern, and experimented with various methods to deal effectively with the India factor. These ranged from attempting to improve relations with India to striving to obtain U.S. goodwill and adequate American guarantees against possible Indian aggression. When both these methods proved unsatisfactory, the Pakistani governmental elite implemented major changes in their alignment pattern. They adopted a bilateral

7

approach to relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Such maneuverings makes the 1958-65 period an important one in the study of Pakistan's external relations.

In order to demonstrate as distinctly as possible the shifting pattern of Pakistan's relations with these four countries, the 1958-65 time span was divided into two periods -- the first period extending from January 1958 to September 1962, and the second period beginning in October 1962 (the date of the Sino-Indian border war) and ending in December 1965. The comments of S. M. Burke, G. W. Choudhury, and President Ayub, mentioned in Chapter I, indicate that October 1962 was a major turning point in Pakistan's alignment pattern and in her relations with India. The massive supply of Western armaments to India in 1962 was followed, on the one hand, by a sharp increase in the Pakistani concern with the India factor, and on the other hand, by a major change in Pakistan's foreign policy priorities and in her external alignment pattern.¹² The selection of October 1962 as a dividing point was thus considered appropriate for observing Pakistan's changing relations with India, the United, the Soviet Union and China.

Since the first set of hypotheses dealing with the Pakistani perception of external threat was formulated in annual terms, the

¹²See Chapter 1, p. 8, p. 10, pp. 18-20.

data, in addition to being tabulated into two periods (with October 1962 as a dividing point), will also be tabulated on an annual basis.

The research method adopted thus creates a framework for a study of the changing pattern of Pakistan's relations with India, the United States, the Soviet Union and China. By comparing the changing level of press approvals/disapprovals accorded to the policies of these four countries prior to and since October 1962, an overall view of the shifts in Pakistan's relations with these four countries was obtained. While such an overall view was helpful and worthwhile, the data tabulated on an annual basis also permitted a more detailed perspective on Pakistan's external relations. Thereby, a truly comprehensive picture of Pakistan's relations with these four countries was obtained.

CHAPTER III

THE INDIA FACTOR

"Pakistan will always find it difficult to quantitatively keep pace with India; but qualitatively we have maintained a balance in the past and have to continue to maintain it in the future for our survival."¹

Bhutto; 29 December 1966.

The extent of concern of the Pakistani governmental elite with their big neighbour, India, is revealed by the attention given to her in the front page stories and editorials of Dawn during the 1958-65 period. Table 3-1 indicates that in both period 1 and period 2, India received a greater front page and editorial coverage in Dawn than the United States, the Soviet Union, or China. Although neighbouring states generally tend to receive some additional coverage in each other's newspapers, the sizeable attention given

¹H. Jalal, K. Hasan (eds.), Awakening the People: A Collection of Articles, Statements and Speeches by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), p. 21.

TABLE 3-1

PERCENTAGE OF FRONT PAGE STORIES AND EDITORIALS DEALING WITH
THE FOUR MAJOR POWERS, BY PERIOD*

Front page Stories	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)	Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)
India	43.7%	63.4%
United States	39.4%	31.4%
Soviet Union	24.3%	13.4%
China	8.3%	24.4%
Editorials	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 89)	Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 79)
India	56.2%	69.6%
United States	55.1%	55.7%
Soviet Union	39.3%	16.5%
China	20.2%	30.4%

*Since a single story or editorial may deal with more than one country, percentages do not add up to 100.

to India in the elite-press of Pakistan was not merely an outcome of the contiguous borders existing between the two countries.

China was also a neighbouring state of Pakistan, but did not figure nearly as prominently as India in the front page stories and editorials of Dawn.

Table 3-2 provides us with a more satisfactory explanation for the greater coverage given to India. It is seen in Table 3-2 that in both periods 1 and 2, the Pakistani governmental elite perceived India as being the major external threat. In period 1, 3.8% of front page stories and 12.4% of editorials dealt with the Indian threat. During this same period, the front page stories and editorials referring to the threat from the United States, the Soviet Union and China were either non-existent or at a very low level compared to the perceived threat from India. And in period 2, while the percentage of front page stories and editorials dealing with the threat from India rose sharply to 14.8% and 39.2% respectively, no front page story or editorial referred to a possible threat from any of the other three countries.

The sharp rise in the perceived threat from India in period 2, as seen in Table 3-2, coupled with the observation that the fear of India was greater than the fear of any of the other three countries in both periods 1 and 2 confirms Hypothesis 1a.

While establishing that India was perceived by the Pakistani governmental elite as being the main threat, it is, however, important

TABLE 3-2

PERCENTAGE OF FRONT PAGE STORIES AND EDITORIALS DEALING WITH
FEAR OF ARMED ATTACK, BY PERIOD

Front page Stories	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)	Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)
India	3.8%	14.8%
United States	0	0
Soviet Union	0.6%	0.0%
China	0.2%	0.0%
Editorials	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 89)	Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 79)
India	12.4%	39.2%
United States	0	0
Soviet Union	2.2%	0.0%
China	1.1%	0.0%

to note that table 3-2 provides us only with a macro-perspective of the perceived external threat. The data presented in Table 3-3 indicates that the fear of India did not remain at a constantly high level throughout the 1958-65 period. For instance, in 1959, only 3.5% of front page stories and 5.9% of editorials expressed a fear of India. And in 1960, no front page story or editorial referred to the threat from India.

The lower level of Pakistani fear of India in period 1, in comparison to period 2, can be partially accounted for by the relaxation of tension between the two countries in 1959 and 1960. The distinct decline in the expressed fear of India during these years indicated the existence of some optimism among the Pakistani government elite about the possibility of a normalisation of relations with India and a peaceful resolution of the outstanding issues between the two countries. The settlement of most of the border issues between India and Pakistan during ministerial level conferences held in October 1959 and January 1960,² and the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan on 19 September 1960, had contributed significantly to the Pakistani optimism.

But in spite of this optimism that prevailed in the late-fifties and in 1960, the data collected for this study indicates that during period 1, substantial differences continued to exist between India and Pakistan. In table 3-4, it is seen that, in

² S. M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), p. 171.

TABLE 3-3

PERCENTAGE OF FRONT PAGE STORIES AND EDITORIALS DEALING WITH
THE FEAR OF ARMED ATTACK FROM INDIA, BY YEAR

Front Page Stories	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
N =	363	456	356	311	277	360	448	539
Fear of India	7.7%	3.5%	0.0%	2.3%	8.3%	10.8%	9.6%	22.6%
Editorials	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
N =	16	17	21	14	27	16	19	38
Fear of India	12.5%	5.9%	0.0%	21.4%	25.9%	37.5%	10.5%	55.3%

TABLE 3-4

FRONT PAGE AND EDITORIAL TREATMENT OF SOUTH ASIAN POLICIES
OF INDIA, BY PERIOD

	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)			Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)		
	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval
Front Page Stories	2.5%	4.6%	12.7%	0.2%	7.4%	33.4%
	(N = 89)			(N = 79)		
Editorials	1.1%	2.0%	31.5%	0.0%	0.0%	64.6%

comparison to 2.5% of front page stories and 1.1% of editorials approving of India's South Asian policies in period 1, 12.7% of front page stories and 31.5% of editorials disapproved of Indian policies in South Asia during the same period. Pakistan's relations with India in period 1 were clearly far from being satisfactory.

One of the major roadblocks to an improvement of Indo-Pakistan relations was the Kashmir problem. The extent of the importance attached by the Pakistani governmental elite to the Kashmir issue is clear from Table 3-5. In both periods 1 and 2, a sizeable percentage of front page stories and editorials of Dawn dealt with Kashmir. Much of this attention given to Kashmir was, however, in the form of a disapproval of the Indian policies in Kashmir. As seen in Table 3-6, 7.4% of front page stories and 19.1% of editorials appearing in Dawn in period 1 expressed a disapproval of the Indian policies in Kashmir. In comparison to this, the level of approvals during the same period was negligible. The high level of Pakistani disapprovals indicates the extent of Pakistani frustration with India over the Kashmir issue. In an effort to make Nehru agree to a plebiscite in Kashmir, Ayub had, during his talks with the Indian leader in September 1960, repeatedly made the joint-defence proposal.³ But Nehru was neither interested

³ Ibid., p. 172.

TABLE 3-5

PERCENTAGE OF FRONT PAGE STORIES AND EDITORIALS DEALING WITH
KASHMIR, BY PERIOD

	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)	Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)
Front Page Stories	14.9%	29.3%
	(N = 89)	(N = 79)
Editorials	19.1%	35.4%

TABLE 3-6

FRONT PAGE AND EDITORIAL TREATMENT OF INDIAN POLICIES
RELATED TO KASHMIR, BY PERIOD

	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)			Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)		
	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval
Front Page Stories	0.2%	0.4%	7.4%	0.2%	2.7%	18.5%
	(N = 89)			(N = 79)		
Editorials	--	--	19.1%	--	--	32.9%

in the joint-defence idea nor in seeking any change in the status quo prevailing in Kashmir. The Indian leader was more interested in making Kashmir a showpiece of Hindu-Muslim amity and cooperation -- thus demonstrating to the two-nation theorists responsible for having created Pakistan that secularism was a philosophy which could have kept the Muslims and the Hindus coexisting side by side in an undivided India.⁴

Thus, unlike the successful resolution of some of the other outstanding issues, the deadlock on the Kashmir problem persisted. When Nehru left for India after his talks with Ayub, no solution to the Kashmir problem was in sight. This appeared to be a bad omen for the future trends in Pakistan's relations with India.

Hence, in contrast to the limited Pakistani optimism of period 1, period 2 was ushered in with an increasing sense of pessimism among the Pakistani governmental elite about the possibilities of an improvement (or even normalisation) of relations with India. The data collected for this study dramatically indicates the increased tension in Indo-Pakistani relations from October 1962 onwards. While approvals of the Indian policies in Kashmir remained at a negligible level in period 2, front page and editorial disapprovals rose sharply to 18.5% and 32.9%, respectively (see Table 3-6). The Pakistani frustration over Kashmir was

⁴Ibid., p. 91.

intensified in period 2 by the theft of the hair of the Holy Prophet Mohammad on 27 December 1963 from the Hazratbal mosque near Srinagar (in Jammu Kashmir), and by measures adopted by the Indian government to integrate Kashmir more fully into the Indian Union.⁵ On 4 December 1964, the Home Minister of India, G. L. Nanda announced the Indian decision to expand the applicability of Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir, thereby permitting the Indian President to declare presidential rule in Kashmir.⁶

Pakistan's increased bitterness with India in period 2 did not, however, remain restricted to the Kashmir issue. The rise in the level of press-disapprovals of the Indian policies in Kashmir from late 1962 coincided with an overall rise in the Pakistani dissatisfaction with India. Table 3-7 indicates that disapprovals of Indian policies in both non-South Asia and South Asia rose in period 2. The rise in the level of disapprovals was, however, more pronounced in the case of the South Asian policies of India -- thereby indicating a greater Pakistani concern with the Indian policies in this area.

The sharp rise in the Pakistani fear of India in period 2, mentioned earlier, was part of this general deterioration in Pakistan's relations with India in period 2. While the deadlock

⁵Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 319.

⁶Ibid., pp. 322-323.

TABLE 3-7

FRONT PAGE AND EDITORIAL TREATMENT OF INDIAN POLICIES
IN SOUTH ASIA AND NON-SOUTH ASIA, BY PERIOD

Front Page Stories	Period 1 (Jan. 1958- Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)			Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)		
	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval
South Asia	2.5%	4.6%	12.7%	0.2%	7.4%	33.4%
Non-South Asia	0.1%	0.8%	0.4%	0.1%	2.4%	4.1%
Editorials	(N = 89)			(N = 79)		
South Asia	1.1%	2.0%	31.5%	0.0%	0.0%	64.6%
Non-South Asia	--	--	1.1%	--	--	11.4%

over Kashmir persisted, and Indo-Pakistan relations remained highly unsatisfactory, the massive supply of armaments by the Western powers to India in late 1962 heightened the Pakistani fear of direct armed aggression by India. The full implications of the dangers inherent in the unsatisfactory state of relations existing between the two countries became clearly manifest to the Pakistani governmental elite when armed hostilities broke out between India and Pakistan in April 1965 and again in September 1965. The perceived threat from India now seemed all the more real to the Pakistani governmental elite -- thereby raising the Pakistani fear of India in period 2 to a level significantly higher than in period 1.

The low relevance of the ideological factor to this entire process of deteriorating Pakistani relations with India in period 2 is indicated by the rather limited coverage given by Dawn to the Indian ideology. During the entire 1958-65 period, only five editorials and forty-three front page stories referred to the ideology of India. And out of the forty-three front page stories dealing with India's ideology, twenty-six appeared in 1961 and were mostly concerned with the communal problems in the town of Jabalpur in India (figures not shown in tabular form). The data indicates no pervading Pakistani interest in the Indian ideology -- thereby leading us to conclude that the ideological differences existing between Pakistan and India were not a major concern of the Pakistani government elite. The Pakistani emphasis was on

more immediate and pressing matters. Prominent among these were the threat of armed aggression by India and the unresolved Kashmir dispute. The nature of the coverage given to both these issues however, indicated that in period 2, Pakistan's relations with India had sharply deteriorated -- thereby making the prospects for lasting peace in the region appear increasingly remote.

CHAPTER IV

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

"Each country of the subcontinent watched warily what the United States did for the other and was not slow to criticize the American policies which each regarded as affecting its power position in relation to the other. Carrying its bag of loaves and fishes -- and knives -- the United States walked the tightrope, tossing some to the right and then to the left, as its interest required."¹

Akin to India, the United States also received, during the 1958-65 period, substantial attention in the front page stories and editorials of Dawn. This is seen in Table 4-1. Although front page stories dealing with the United States somewhat declined in period 2, the attention given to her in both periods 1 and 2 remained, in general, at a high level. However, unlike the Pakistani fear of India which contributed to the overall attention given to India, no front page story or editorial appearing in Dawn during the entire 1958-65 period referred to a threat from the

¹ M. S. Venkataramani and H. C. Arya, "America's Military Alliance with Pakistan: The Evolution and Course of an Uneasy Partnership," International Studies, vol. 8, nos. 1-2 (July-October, 1966), pp. 82-83.

TABLE 4-1

PERCENTAGE OF FRONT PAGE STORIES AND EDITORIALS DEALING WITH
THE UNITED STATES, BY PERIOD

	Period 1 (Jan. 1958- Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)	Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)
Front Page Stories	39.4%	31.4%
	(N = 89)	(N = 79)
Editorials	55.1%	55.7%

United States. Hence Hypothesis 1c, stating that the threat from the United States was consistently perceived to be non-existent is confirmed.²

In attempting to identify some of the major factors which contributed to the sizeable Pakistani interest in the United States and significantly influenced Pakistan's attitude towards Washington, the data collected for this study indicates the low relevance of ideological considerations. Only four front page stories and one editorial during the entire 1958-65 period dealt with the American ideology. Clearly, considerations of ideological similarity or dissimilarity with the United States were not of any great concern to the Pakistani governmental elite either in period 1 or in period 2. Hence Hypothesis 2, stating that ideological factors played a significant role in shaping Pakistan's foreign policy alignments until 1962, is not confirmed in the case of Pakistan's relations with the United States.

The data collected for this study also provide no clear indication that the Kashmir factor was a major determinant of Pakistan's attitude towards the United States. In Table 4-2, it is seen that, in both periods 1 and 2, the level of concerned attention (approval/disapproval) given in the front page stories of Dawn to the United States' policies on Kashmir was fairly low.

²The extent of perceived threat from China, which is a part of Hypothesis 1c, will be discussed in Chapter VI.

TABLE 4-2

FRONT PAGE AND EDITORIAL TREATMENT OF AMERICAN POLICIES
RELATED TO KASHMIR, BY PERIOD

	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)			Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)		
	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval
Front Page Stories	0.5%	0.2%	0.4%	0.1%	0.6%	2.1%
	(N = 89)			(N = 79)		
Editorials	--	0.0%	9.0%	--	1.3%	8.9%

The level of concerned attention, in the form of disapprovals, was however, somewhat higher in the editorials, viz. 9% in period 1 and 8.9% in period 2.

Because of this disparity in the level of concerned attention given in the front page stories and in the editorials of Dawn to the American policies on Kashmir, Hypothesis 3a, in the case of the United States, is neither confirmed nor refuted. However, the absence of any editorial approving of the American policies on the Kashmir problem during the entire 1958-65 period, and the low level of front page approvals of the American policies on this issue in both periods 1 and 2, as seen in Table 4-2, indicates that the Pakistani government elite was far from being satisfied with the American policies on Kashmir -- a major bone of contention between India and Pakistan. At no stage during the 1958-65 period did the United States respond favourably to the Pakistani suggestion that American economic and military aid to India be made conditional on a satisfactory settlement of the Kashmir problem,³ thus making the low level of expressed approvals quite understandable.

While the Pakistani satisfaction with the American policies on Kashmir remained at a marginal level, the shift in the level of disapprovals from the first period to the second, as seen in Table 4-2, does not indicate any major increase in the Pakistani dissatisfaction

³See Chapter 1 for details.

with the Americans on this issue in the latter period. Although front page disapprovals rose moderately from 0.4% in period 1 to 2.1% in period 2, editorial disapprovals remained at approximately the same level in both periods.

Notwithstanding the inconclusive findings on the American policies in Kashmir, the great importance attached by the Pakistani governmental elite to the overall American policies in South Asia is adequately manifest in the data. The extent and nature of front page and editorial coverage given to the South Asian policies of the United States, as compared to the non-South Asian policies, is shown in Table 4-3. It is noted that, excepting one instance, the concerned attention (approval/disapproval) given, in both periods 1 and 2, to the South Asian policies of the United States always exceeded the concerned attention paid to the non-South Asian policies.⁴ Also, it can be seen that a sizeable proportion of the front page and editorial coverage given to the non-South Asian policies of the United States was in the form of neutral attention or a mere reporting of the American policies. Such a finding confirms Hypothesis 3, as far as the United States is concerned. In other words, we can maintain that the American policies towards South

⁴The exception was in the case of the percentage of editorial approvals of the non-South Asian policies of the United States during period 1, which exceeded the percentage approvals of the American policies in South Asia during the same period.

TABLE 4-3

FRONT PAGE AND EDITORIAL TREATMENT OF AMERICAN POLICIES IN
SOUTH ASIA AND NON-SOUTH ASIA, BY PERIOD

Front Page Stories	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)			Period 2 (Oct 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)		
	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval
South Asia	4.3%	3.4%	2.3%	0.3%	4.8%	8.0%
Non-South Asia	2.3%	11.7%	1.6%	0.2%	5.0%	5.0%
Editorials	(N = 89)			(N = 79)		
South Asia	3.4%	1.1%	19.1%	1.3%	1.3%	27.8%
Non-South Asia	9.0%	6.7%	6.7%	0.0%	7.6%	19.0%

Asia played a major part in determining Pakistan's attitude towards the United States.

The level of approvals and disapprovals of the American policies, as seen in Table 4-3, suggests that, in both periods 1 and 2, the Pakistani governmental elite was far from being fully satisfied with the United States. The mixed feeling of the Pakistani governmental elite towards Washington in period 1 is apparent from the simultaneous expressions of approvals and disapprovals of the United States which appeared in the front page stories and editorials of Dawn during this period. The possibility of an American tilt in favour of India had become apparent to Ayub and the Pakistani governmental elite already in period 1. At a press conference held in Washington on 26 May 1961 (soon after a visit to the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent), the American Vice-President Johnson had revealed that, on Kennedy's request, he had asked Nehru "to extend his leadership to other areas in Southeast Asia."⁵ Such statements could hardly be overlooked by the Pakistani leaders, and, shortly afterwards, during a visit to Washington in July 1961, Ayub expressed grave concern over reports of a possible American arms

⁵ Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 269. Even in the present times, Pakistan is very sensitive about such pronouncements. In a statement made by a Foreign Office spokesman on 28 July 1977, Pakistan expressed its displeasure over the comment by American Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, that the United States expected India to take the position of leadership in South Asia. See Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Research Directorate, Foreign Affairs: vol. IV, no. 7 (July, 1977), p. 45.

supply to India. He also hinted that, if American arms were supplied to India, Pakistan would be compelled to reexamine her commitments to S.E.A.T.O. and C.E.N.T.O.⁶

The sharp rise in the press disapprovals and the decline in the level of approvals of the American policies from October 1962 onwards, as seen in Table 4-3, indicates that whatever hopes the Pakistani government may have earlier entertained about the United States and her commitments to Pakistan's security and well-being had rapidly dissipated in period 2. In addition, to providing massive arms supplies to India in late 1962 and adopting a "neutral" stance during the September 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, Washington had, in period 2, resorted to several measures to punish Pakistan for having made overtures towards China. On 30 August 1963, immediately after the signing of the Sino-Pakistan Civil Aviation Agreement, the United States retaliated by suspending the \$4.3 million loan pledged to Pakistan for the construction of a new airport at Dacca.⁷ Such punitive measures continued through 1965. While economic assistance to India under the "Aid to India Consortium" was sanctioned without Congressional authorization, the United States refused to do the same in the case of "ally" Pakistan. And, on 3 July 1965,

⁶Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, p. 108.

⁷G. J. Lerski, "The Pakistan-American Alliance: A Reevaluation of the Past Decade," Asian Survey, vol. VIII, no. 5 (May, 1968), p. 410.

the American ambassador in Pakistan informed President Ayub of the sudden decision to postpone by two months the "Aid to Pakistan Consortium" meeting, scheduled originally for July 1965. Since the funds were much needed for Pakistan's ambitious Third Five Year Plan, launched on 1 July 1965, this came as a severe blow to Pakistan.⁸

Since a low ebb in Pak-American relations in period 2 is clearly manifest in Table 4-3, Hypothesis 3b, stating that U.S. arms aid to India in late 1962 was followed by a major Pakistani disillusionment with the United States, is confirmed. Whether such a disillusionment with Washington was accompanied by an improvement in Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union and China will be examined in subsequent chapters.

⁸See ibid., p. 412 and Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, p. 117.

CHAPTER V

RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

"We should endeavour to set up bilateral equations ... with the clear understanding that the nature and complexion of the equation should be such as to promote our mutual interests without adversely affecting the legitimate interests of third parties....

No bilateral equation could be established in isolation; other equations would influence its level So each equation would have to be acceptable to third parties with whom we might be able to establish bilateral relations of mutual benefit."¹

Unlike India and the United States, the Soviet Union did not receive extensive coverage in the front page stories and editorials of Dawn during the 1958-65 period. It is seen in Table 5-1 that although the coverage given to the Soviet Union in period 1 was not very low, front page stories and editorials dealing with the Soviet Union declined sharply in period 2 -- thereby indicating a reduced Pakistani attention to the Soviet Union

¹ Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 118-119.

TABLE 5-1

PERCENTAGE OF FRONT PAGE STORIES AND EDITORIALS DEALING WITH
THE SOVIET UNION, BY PERIOD

	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)	Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)
Front Page Stories	24.3%	13.4%
	(N = 89)	(N = 79)
Editorials	39.3%	16.5%

Some of the Pakistani attention to Moscow in period 1 took the form of a fear of the Soviet Union. This is seen in Table 5-2. While the Soviet threat was perceived to be non-existent in most years during the 1958-65 period, a fear of the Soviet Union was expressed in 2.8% of front page stories and 9.5% of editorials appearing in Dawn in 1960 -- the year when the U-2 incident occurred. Since the fear of India remained at zero in 1960, our data suggests that during this year, the Pakistani governmental elite perceived the Soviet Union as a greater threat than India. The above mentioned findings thus do not confirm the contention, as stated in Hypothesis 1d, that the Soviet threat was perceived to be significant until at least 1961, but was consistently perceived to be secondary to the Indian threat.

While examining the data, the marginal importance of ideological factors in shaping Pakistan's attitude towards the Soviet Union becomes apparent. Only four front page stories and no editorial appearing in Dawn during the period under review referred directly to the ideology of the Soviet Union. However, as shown in Table 5-3, some additional front page and editorial coverage was given to Communism and Communist activities, both within Pakistan and outside Pakistan. Although Table 5-3 reveals some degree of interest of the Pakistani governmental elite in Communist activities outside Pakistan, it does not necessarily follow from this that

TABLE 5-2

PERCENTAGE OF FRONT PAGE STORIES AND EDITORIALS DEALING WITH
FEAR OF ARMED ATTACK FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND INDIA, BY YEAR

Front Page Stories	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
N =	363	456	356	311	277	360	448	539
Fear of the Soviet Union	0.0%	0.0%	2.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Fear of India	7.7%	3.5%	0.0%	2.3%	8.3%	10.8%	9.6%	22.6%
Editorials	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
N =	16	17	21	14	27	16	19	38
Fear of the Soviet Union	0.0%	0.0%	9.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Fear of India	12.5%	5.9%	0.0%	21.4%	25.9%	37.5%	10.5%	55.3%

TABLE 5-3

PERCENTAGE OF FRONT PAGE STORIES AND EDITORIALS DEALING WITH
COMMUNISM, BY PERIOD

Front Page Stories	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)	Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)
Communism in Pakistan	0.1%	0.1%
Communism outside Pakistan	8.2%	4.6%
Editorials	(N = 89)	(N = 79)
Communism in Pakistan	0	0
Communism outside Pakistan	7.9%	13.9%

ideological factors played an important role in determining Pakistan's attitude towards the Soviet Union, either in the first period or in the second. Hence Hypothesis 2, stating that ideological factors played a significant role in shaping Pakistan's foreign policy alignments until 1962, but declined in importance after 1962, is not confirmed.

Although the low importance attached to ideological considerations may be interpreted as an indication of the pragmatic moorings of Pakistan's foreign-policy, the findings related to the Soviet policy on Kashmir are somewhat more difficult to account for. Table 5-4 shows that, during the period reviewed, the general Pakistani concern with the Soviet policies on Kashmir was very limited. Front page and editorial expressions of approval and disapproval remained at a low level in both periods 1 and 2. Hence, Hypothesis 3a, stating that the Soviet policies on the Kashmir problem played a major part in determining Pakistan's attitude towards the Soviet Union is not confirmed. Although it is unlikely that the governmental elite in Pakistan was not concerned with the Soviet stand on Kashmir -- a major dispute between India and Pakistan, such a concern was not reflected in the elite-press.

The findings on the extent of importance attached by the Pakistani governmental elite to the Soviet policies in South Asia are also contrary to our expectations based on the review of the literature. In Table 5-5, no clear indication is

TABLE 5-4

FRONT PAGE AND EDITORIAL TREATMENT OF SOVIET POLICIES
RELATED TO KASHMIR, BY PERIOD

	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)			Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)		
	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval
Front Page Stories	0.0%	0.1%	0.6%	0.3%	0.1%	0.4%
	(N = 89)			(N = 79)		
Editorials	--	0.0%	1.1%	--	1.3%	0.0%

TABLE 5-5

FRONT PAGE AND EDITORIAL TREATMENT OF SOVIET POLICIES IN
SOUTH ASIA AND NON-ASIA, BY PERIOD

Front Page Stories	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)			Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)		
	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval
South Asia	0.7%	1.4%	2.1%	1.9%	1.9%	0.9%
Non-South Asia	0.4%	9.2%	2.8%	0.3%	3.8%	0.3%
Editorials	(N = 89)			(N = 79)		
	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval
South Asia	2.2%	3.4%	5.6%	0.0%	1.3%	2.5%
Non-South Asia	7.9%	3.4%	9.0%	1.3%	5.1%	1.3%

available of a greater Pakistani preoccupation with the Soviet policies in South Asia, as compared to non-South Asia, or vice versa. Out of a total of eight pairs of concerned attention (approval/disapproval) provided in Table 5-5, it is noted that in four instances, the concerned attention given to the South Asian policies was greater, and in the other four instances, the non-South Asian policies received a higher level of concerned attention.²

Such a balanced distribution leaves Hypothesis 3 neither confirmed nor refuted.

The level of approvals and disapprovals of the Soviet policies, prior to October 1962 and from this date onwards, as shown in Table 5-5, also precludes any definitive statement on Hypothesis 3c. Although front page and editorial disapprovals of the Soviet policies in both non-South Asia and South Asia declined in period 2, this decline was not accompanied by any prominent rise in the approvals of the Soviet policies. With the exception of front page approvals of the Soviet policies in South Asia, which rose moderately in the second period, all other approvals of the Soviet policies, as seen in the above mentioned table, underwent a decline. The above mentioned shifts tie in with our

²The concerned attention given to the South Asian policies was greater in the case of front page approvals in period 1, front page approvals in period 2, front page disapprovals in period 2 and editorial disapprovals in period 2. The concerned attention given to the non-South Asian policies was greater in the case of front page disapprovals in period 1, editorial approvals in period 1, editorial disapprovals in period 1, and editorial approvals in period 2.

earlier observation that, from October 1962 onwards, the attention paid to the Soviet Union in the Pakistani elite-press declined.

Although the data collected for this study does not indicate any pronounced or distinct improvement in Pak-Soviet relations in period 2, the definite decline in press disapprovals of the Soviet Union from October 1962 onwards reveals the emergence of an era of understanding, if not of friendship, between the two countries. The signing of several cultural, credit, commercial and technical agreements between the two countries in period 2 and the consequent increase in the level of Pak-Soviet cooperation in non-political matters,³ coupled with the Soviet policy of neutrality towards India and Pakistan during the September 1965 war, contributed to this emerging era of understanding.

But that was as far as the Pak-Soviet relationship developed in period 2. The low level of press approvals of the Soviet Union in this period indicate that Pakistan was far from being pleased with the Soviet Union. Such a Pakistani sentiment towards Moscow was quite understandable. In January 1964, the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan had explicitly stated that, in its quest for better relations with Pakistan, the Soviet Union could not be

³ For a summarised account of the agreements negotiated between the Soviet Union and Pakistan from October, 1962 onwards, and the extent of Pakistani trade with the Soviet Union, see appendix D and appendix E in J. P. Jain, Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan and Bangladesh (Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1974), pp. 237-238, p. 241.

expected to worsen her relations with India (and Afghanistan).⁴ Hence, Pakistan's principal adversary, India, continued to receive Soviet armaments, and in September 1964, Moscow agreed to extend additional military aid worth \$400 million to India, which was to include three squadrons of the MIG-21 fighter aircrafts.⁵ The Pakistani governmental elite could hardly be expected to express satisfaction with such a Soviet policy direction in South Asia.

Thus in period 2, a considerable degree of uncertainty persisted in Pak-Soviet relations. However, the data suggest that much had yet to be achieved by way of a real improvement in relations between the two countries.

⁴Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, p. 36.

⁵Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

RELATIONS WITH CHINA

"If we are attacked by India then that means that India is on the move and wants to expand. We assume that other Asiatic powers especially China would take notice of that."¹

Akin to its treatment of the Soviet Union, the Dawn coverage of China was limited, relative to the United States and India. This was, as seen in Table 6-1, especially true in period 1. In period 2, however, the attention given to China underwent a definite rise -- thereby indicating the increased interest of the Pakistani governmental elite in China.

Table 6-2 provides some indications regarding the nature of Sino-Pakistani relations during the period under review. It is seen that while references to the Chinese threat generally remained at zero, 1.9% of editorials in 1959 and 0.8% of front page stories in 1960 expressed a fear of China. Hence, Hypothesis 1c, stating

¹ Ayub's statement, as reported in the Washington Post, 12 September 1963, and cited in Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, p. 181.

TABLE 6-1

PERCENTAGE OF FRONT PAGE STORIES AND EDITORIALS DEALING WITH
CHINA, BY PERIOD

	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)	Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)
Front Page Stories	8.3%	24.4%
	(N = 89)	(N = 79)
Editorials	20.2%	30.4%

TABLE 6-2

PERCENTAGE OF FRONT PAGE STORIES AND EDITORIALS DEALING WITH
FEAR OF ARMED ATTACK FROM CHINA AND INDIA, BY YEAR

Front Page Stories	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
N =	363	456	356	311	277	360	448	539
Fear of China	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Fear of India	7.7%	3.5%	0.0%	2.3%	8.3%	10.8%	9.6%	22.6%
Editorials	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
N =	16	17	21	14	27	16	19	38
Fear of China	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Fear of India	12.5%	5.9%	0.0%	21.4%	25.9%	37.5%	10.5%	55.3%

that the threat from China was consistently perceived to be non-existent needs to be qualified.

Although the above mentioned findings concerning the Pakistani fear of China lend some credibility to the argument that the Chinese action in Tibet in March 1959 had increased the Pakistani awareness of a possible Chinese incursion into South Asia, they do not go as far as to confirm Hypothesis 1b, which states that the threat from China was perceived to be a greater threat to Pakistan than the threat from India during the 1959-60 period. A comparison of the levels of the fear of China and the fear of India during this period does not suggest that the Pakistani elites perceived either China or India as posing a greater threat than the other.

Our findings on the role of both ideology and the Kashmir factor in shaping Pakistan's attitude towards China are not too different from the earlier observations made in the case of Pakistan's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. The question of ideological similarity or dissimilarity with China did not figure prominently in the front page stories and editorials of Dawn. Only one editorial and no front page story during the entire 1958-65 period made a direct reference to China's ideology. However, as mentioned in Chapter V, some front page stories and editorials did deal with Communism within Pakistan and also outside Pakistan. But no indication is available from such a coverage that the ideological factor had, at any time during

the 1958-65 period, any great bearing either on Pakistan's alignment pattern or on Pakistan's attitude towards China. Hypothesis 2 is thus not confirmed in the case of Pakistan's relations with China.

The extent and nature of coverage given to China's policies on the Kashmir problem is shown in Table 6-3. The low level of approvals and disapprovals of Peking's stand on the Kashmir issue, as seen in Table 6-3, suggests that the Kashmir factor was not a major determinant of Pakistan's attitude towards China. Hence, Hypothesis 3a is not confirmed in the case of China. In response to this absence of any indication in the data of a major influence of the Kashmir factor on Pakistan's attitude towards China, all that needs to be said at this point is that, given the great Pakistani concern with the Kashmir issue, in general, it was unlikely that Pakistan's attitude towards China was not indirectly affected by the Kashmir factor.

Although there is no indication in the data of a major Pakistani interest in the Chinese policies on the Kashmir issue, the sizeable importance attached by the Pakistani governmental elite to the broader topic of the South Asian policies of China is amply demonstrated in Table 6-4. It is noted that, with the exception of the disapprovals of the Chinese policies in the second period which were either zero or close to zero, the concerned attention (approval/disapproval) given to the South Asian policies of China in the front

TABLE 6-3

FRONT PAGE AND EDITORIAL TREATMENT OF CHINA'S POLICIES RELATED
TO KASHMIR, BY PERIOD

Front Page Stories	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)			Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)		
	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval
	0.2%	--	0.1%	1.0%	--	0.0%
Editorials	(N = 89)			(N = 79)		
	1.1%	--	--	0.0%	--	--

TABLE 6-4

FRONT PAGE AND EDITORIAL TREATMENT OF CHINESE POLICIES IN
SOUTH ASIA AND NON-SOUTH ASIA, BY PERIOD

Front Page Stories	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)			Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)		
	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval
South Asia	0.9%	1.6%	1.5%	6.4%	4.4%	0.0%
Non-South Asia	0.2%	0.8%	0.5%	1.5%	3.7%	0.1%
Editorials	(N = 89)			(N = 79)		
South Asia	6.7%	1.1%	4.5%	16.5%	2.5%	0.0%
Non-South Asia	1.1%	1.1%	1.1%	6.3%	2.5%	0.0%

page stories and editorials of Dawn always exceeded the concerned attention paid to the non-South Asian policies of China. Also, the shifts in the approvals and disapprovals from the first period to the second, as seen in Table 6-4, are more pronounced in the case of the South Asian policies of China, as compared to the non-South Asian policies. Hence Hypothesis 3, stating that the South Asian policies of China played a major part in determining Pakistan's attitude towards China is confirmed by our findings.

Table 6-4 also permits us to observe the changes in the nature of Sino-Pakistani relations from the first period to the second. The generally low level of both approvals and disapprovals of the Chinese policies in period 1, though suggesting the existence of some uncertainty in Sino-Pakistani relations prior to October 1962, also indicates that no major differences existed between the two countries during this period. As discussed in Chapter 1, China had always refrained from strongly criticizing Pakistan's membership in the American-sponsored alliances and avoided supporting the Indian stand on the Kashmir issue -- thus explaining the low level of disapprovals of China appearing in the elite press of Pakistan.

While the skillful Chinese diplomacy in South Asia had precluded Pakistan from being too dissatisfied with Peking in the first period, Table 6-4 shows a definite improvement in relations between the two countries in the second period. Approvals of the Chinese policies in both non-South Asia and South Asia rose in the second period, and the disapprovals dropped to zero or close to zero.

In addition to the increased level of Sino-Pakistani cooperation in the non-political sphere, period 2 had witnessed a definite Chinese support to Pakistan in her conflict with India in September 1965 -- thus making the rise in approvals and decline in disapprovals not an unexpected phenomenon.

Since the increased cordiality with Peking in the second period, as noted in Table 6-4, occurred simultaneously with the process of increasing Pakistani disillusionment with the United States from October 1962 onwards, Hypothesis 3c is confirmed in the case of Pakistan's relations with China.

Thus, unlike the marginal success achieved by Pakistan in improving relations with the Soviet Union, the Sino-Pakistani equation, in period 2, provided much satisfaction to the Pakistani governmental elite -- as manifest by the distinct rise in the press approvals and the decline in the disapprovals to zero (or close to) during this period. And in the subsequent years, Pakistan's relations with China continued to be cordial and friendly.²

²For a summarised account of Sino-Pakistani relations in the post-1965 period, see Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, pp. 188-198.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In drawing conclusions on the research conducted herein, it may be worthwhile first to summarise the findings of this study. Prominent amongst our findings was the observation that India was regarded by the Pakistani governmental elite as being the major source of external threat in both period 1 and period 2. Further, it was noted that the Pakistani fear of India rose sharply from October 1962 onwards.

The Pakistani perception of the threat from the United States, the Soviet Union and China during the period under review, however, differed from the above-mentioned pattern. While the threat from the United States was consistently perceived to be non-existent, the Pakistani fear of China and the Soviet Union remained restricted to the 1959-60 period and to the year 1960 respectively.

Although the findings of our research confirmed that, at the macro level, India was Pakistan's major security concern in

both period 1 and period 2, the hypothesis stating that the threat from India was perceived to be the main threat throughout the 1958-65 period was not confirmed. It was noted that during the 1959-60 period there was no clear Pakistani perception of either China or India as posing a greater threat than the other to her security. And in 1960, the Soviet threat was perceived by the Pakistani governmental elite as being greater than the Indian threat (which remained in zero in 1960).

The data collected for this study also indicated that Pakistan's relations with India, the United States, the Soviet Union and China underwent a change from the earlier period to the latter. The change that occurred in Pakistan's relations with India was definite and pronounced. Although Indo-Pakistani relations remained unsatisfactory in both period 1 and period 2, a serious deterioration in relations between the two countries occurred in the latter period. The sharp rise in the Pakistani fear of India from October 1962 onwards, mentioned earlier, was indicative of this overall deterioration in Indo-Pakistani relations.

The shifts in the level of press approvals and disapprovals of the United States from the earlier period to the latter also indicated a definite decline in Pakistan's relations with Washington in period 2.

Unlike the definite deterioration in Pakistan's relations with India and the United States in the latter period, the Pakistani

dissatisfaction with Moscow declined from October 1962 onwards. Although such a reduction in the Pakistani discontent with the Soviet Union manifested the potentials for an improvement in Pak-Soviet relations, the data suggested that no actual improvement occurred in period 2, and that relations between the two countries remained at best uncertain.

The element of uncertainty observed in Pak-Soviet relations in the second period was similar to the uncertain nature of relations that existed between Pakistan and China prior to October 1962. However, from this date onwards, the uncertainty in Sino-Pakistan relations was replaced by an era of friendship and cordiality.

The data thus confirmed that October 1962 was a major turning point in Pakistan's relations with India, and in her overall alignment pattern with the United States, the Soviet Union and China. However, as noted earlier, the shift that occurred in Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union was not as dramatic as in the case of the other three countries.

Our findings on the determinants of Pakistan's foreign policy indicated that ideological considerations were not of any great consequence either in influencing Pakistan's relations with India or in shaping Pakistan's alignment pattern with the United States, the Soviet Union and China. And although much of Pakistan's differences with India centred around the Kashmir problem, no clear evidence was available in the data that the Kashmir factor played a

major role in determining Pakistan's attitude towards either the United States, the Soviet Union or China.

The findings related to the South Asian policies of India, the United States and China were in keeping with our expectations. It was confirmed that the South Asian policies of these states played a major part in determining Pakistan's attitude towards them. Our findings concerning the Soviet policies in South Asia were, however, inconclusive in nature, and no such confirmation was available.

Thus, although the data examined in this thesis confirmed some of the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 1, our findings in other instances were either inconclusive in nature or contrary to the opinions expressed by analysts of Pakistan's foreign policy. In the subsequent section, an attempt will be made to account for the unexpected and inconclusive findings.

In our opinion the low relevance of the ideological factor as a determinant of Pakistan's alignment pattern with the United States, the Soviet Union and China can be attributed to the high level of the fear of India in most years during the 1958-65 period. Faced with this looming Indian threat, the Pakistani governmental elite did not give too much emphasis to ideological considerations in the shaping of the country's foreign policy alignments.

In attempting to account for the inconclusive nature of our

findings on the Kashmir factor as a determinant of Pakistan's attitude towards the United States, and the low level of concerned attention given by Dawn to the Soviet policies related to Kashmir, it may be mentioned that, during the 1958-65 period, neither Moscow nor Washington had been too appreciative of the Pakistani stand on this issue.¹ In the opinion of the author, it was more than likely that the Soviet and American policies disturbed the Pakistani governmental elite and indirectly influenced Pakistan's attitude towards the two Superpowers. However, the governmental elite of Pakistan may have reasoned that coverage of such policies would only demonstrate the limited amount of international support that Pakistan had on this issue -- and thereby cast doubts on the legitimacy of their stand. Such reasoning by the Pakistani governmental elite may have contributed to the limited press coverage of the Soviet and American policies on the Kashmir issue, and consequently to the low level of concerned attention accorded by Dawn to these policies.

The limited Chinese involvement, during the 1958-65 period, in the Indo-Pakistani dispute over the Kashmir region may have been responsible for the low level of concerned attention given by Dawn to the Chinese policies on the Kashmir problem. Prior to February 1964, China had adopted a neutral stance on this issue and refrained

¹ The American and Soviet policies on the Kashmir problem have been discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis.

from taking sides. And although from this date onwards, Peking endorsed the Pakistani demand for a plebiscite in the region, she was not actively involved in the various international efforts to find a solution to this problem. Since most of the negotiations on the Kashmir issue were held under the aegis of the United Nations, China, a non-member of this international organisation till October 1971, was excluded from these deliberations.

In suggesting a possible explanation for the inconclusive nature of our findings on Moscow's policies in South Asia as a determinant of Pakistan's attitude towards the Soviet Union, reliance on retrospective analysis and speculative reasoning again seems essential. It was noted in the literature reviewed in Chapter 1 that, during the 1958-65 period, the South Asian policies of the Soviet Union had either been pro-Indian in nature or one of neutrality towards India and Pakistan. The Pakistani governmental elite could hardly be expected to derive much satisfaction from such policies. Hence, the level of concerned attention, in the form of approvals of the Soviet policies in South Asia, remained generally at a low level in both period 1 and period 2. And although the governmental elites in Pakistan may have been dissatisfied with the pro-Indian biases of Moscow, they may have preferred not to further antagonise the Soviet Union by strongly disapproving of Moscow's policies in the region. Such considerations may have contributed to make our findings on the South Asian policies of the Soviet Union inconclusive in nature.

The above discussion on the unexpected and inconclusive findings manifests one of the limits of content analysis methods: namely its inability to assess motivations. We have suggested that a low press coverage of a certain issue or a low level of concerned attention given to a certain theme does not necessarily imply a marginal governmental interest in that particular issue or theme. Thus, without an adequate knowledge of the underlying motivations and objectives of the governmental elite, the findings of a content analysis study could be misinterpreted.

In spite of such obvious limitations, the present study indicates that the use of content analysis techniques can be very helpful in studying the changing trends in Pakistan's foreign policy alignments, and in testing some popular myths and postulates on Pakistan's foreign policy.

It is not, however, the intention of the author to suggest the use of content analysis methods as an alternative to the more traditional forms of research. Rather, it is felt that content analysis techniques should be used to supplement the more traditional tools of research generally used by analysts of Pakistan's foreign policy. In the opinion of the author, such a combination of the tools of research would minimise the possibility of a misinterpretation of the findings of a content analysis study, and prove extremely helpful in building a truly comprehensive body of Pakistani foreign policy studies.

APPENDIX 1

Pakistan's Foreign Policy (1958-65): An Examination
of Contending Hypotheses

Hypotheses:

1. Level of concern of the Pakistani governmental elite:
 - a) The threat from India was perceived to be the main threat throughout the 1958-65 period, but increased sharply from late 1962 onwards.
 - b) The threat from China was perceived to be a greater threat than the threat from India during the 1959-60 period.
 - c) The threat to Pakistan from the United States and China was consistently perceived to be non-existent.
 - d) The threat to Pakistan from the Soviet Union was perceived to be significant until at least 1961, but was consistently perceived to be secondary to the Indian threat.
2. Ideological factors played a significant role in shaping Pakistan's foreign policy alignments until 1962, but subsequently declined in importance.
3. The respective policies of the Soviet Union, China and the United States towards South Asia played a major part in determining Pakistan's attitudes towards these states.
 - a) The "Kashmir factor" — the respective policies of the Soviet Union, China and the United States on the Kashmir problem played a major part in determining Pakistan's attitudes towards these states.
 - b) U.S. arms aid to India in late 1962 was followed by a major Pakistani disillusionment with the United States.
 - c) An increasing disillusionment with the United States and her policies in South Asia was accompanied by an improvement in Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union and China.

APPENDIX 2

TABLE I

PERCENTAGE OF FRONT PAGE STORIES AND EDITORIALS DEALING WITH
FOUR MAJOR POWERS, BY PERIOD*

Front page stories	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)	Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)
India	43.7%	63.4%
United States	39.4%	31.4%
Soviet Union	24.3%	13.4%
China	8.3%	24.4%
Editorials	(N = 89)	(N = 79)
India	56.2%	69.6%
United States	55.1%	55.7%
Soviet Union	39.3%	16.5%
China	20.2%	30.4%

*Since a single story or editorial may deal with more than one country, percentages do not add up to 100.

TABLE II

PERCENTAGE OF FRONT PAGE STORIES AND EDITORIALS DEALING WITH
KASHMIR, BY PERIOD

	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)	Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)
Front page stories	14.9%	29.3%
	(N = 89)	(N = 79)
Editorials	19.1%	35.4%

TABLE III

PERCENTAGE OF FRONT PAGE STORIES AND EDITORIALS DEALING WITH
COMMUNISM, BY PERIOD

Front page stories	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)	Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)
Communism in Pakistan	0.1%	0.1%
Communism outside Pakistan	8.2%	4.6%
Editorials	(N = 89)	(N = 79)
Communism in Pakistan	0	0
Communism outside Pakistan	7.9%	13.9%

TABLE IV

PERCENTAGE OF FRONT PAGE STORIES AND EDITORIALS DEALING WITH
FEAR OF ARMED ATTACK, BY PERIOD

Front page stories	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)	Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)
India	3.8%	14.8%
United States	0	0
Soviet Union	0.6%	0.0%
China	0.2%	0.0%
Editorials	(N = 89)	(N = 79)
India	12.4%	39.2%
United States	0	0
Soviet Union	2.2%	0.0%
China	1.1%	0.0%

TABLE V

PERCENTAGE OF FRONT PAGE STORIES AND EDITORIALS DEALING WITH
NON-SOUTH ASIAN POLICIES OF FOUR MAJOR POWERS, BY PERIOD

Front Page Stories	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)			Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)		
	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval
India	0.1%	0.8%	0.4%	0.1%	2.4%	4.1%
United States	2.3%	11.7%	1.6%	0.2%	5.0%	5.0%
Soviet Union	0.4%	9.2%	2.8%	0.3%	3.8%	0.3%
China	0.2%	0.8%	0.5%	1.5%	3.7%	0.1%
Editorials	(N = 89)			(N = 79)		
	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval
India	--	--	1.1%	--	--	11.4%
United States	9.0%	6.7%	6.7%	0.0%	7.6%	19.0%
Soviet Union	7.9%	3.4%	9.0%	1.3%	5.1%	1.3%
China	1.1%	1.1%	1.1%	6.3%	2.5%	0.0%

TABLE VI

PERCENTAGE OF FRONT PAGE STORIES AND EDITORIALS DEALING WITH
SOUTH-ASIAN POLICIES OF FOUR MAJOR POWERS, BY PERIOD

Front Page Stories	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)			Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)		
	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval
India	2.5%	4.6%	12.7%	0.2%	7.4%	33.4%
United States	4.3%	3.4%	2.3%	0.3%	4.8%	8.0%
Soviet Union	0.7%	1.4%	2.1%	1.9%	1.9%	0.9%
China	0.9%	1.6%	1.5%	6.4%	4.4%	0.0%
Editorials	(N = 89)			(N = 79)		
	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval
India	1.1%	2.0%	31.5%	0.0%	0.0%	64.6%
United States	3.4%	1.1%	19.1%	1.3%	1.3%	27.8%
Soviet Union	2.2%	3.4%	5.6%	0.0%	1.3%	2.5%
China	6.7%	1.1%	4.5%	16.5%	2.5%	0.0%

TABLE VII

PERCENTAGE OF FRONT PAGE STORIES AND EDITORIALS DEALING WITH
POLICIES OF FOUR MAJOR POWERS RELATED TO KASHMIR, BY PERIOD

Front page stories	Period 1 (Jan. 1958-Sept. 1962) (N = 1665)			Period 2 (Oct. 1962-Dec. 1965) (N = 1445)		
	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval
India	0.2%	0.4%	7.4%	0.2%	2.7%	18.5%
United States	0.5%	0.2%	0.4%	0.1%	0.6%	2.1%
Soviet Union	0.0%	0.1%	0.6%	0.3%	0.1%	0.4%
China	0.2%	--	0.1%	1.0%	--	0.0%
Editorials	(N = 89)			(N = 79)		
	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval
India	--	--	19.1%	--	--	32.9%
United States	--	0.0%	9.0%	--	1.3%	8.9%
Soviet Union	--	0.0%	1.1%	--	1.3%	0.0%
China	1.1%	--	--	0.0%	--	--

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VITA AUCTORIS

FAMILY: Ashraful Hasan, son of Mr. and the late Mrs. S. Sharafat Hussain of Bangladesh.

Born 30 June 1954.

EDUCATION: Primary education received at Delhi Public School, Delhi, India and Karachi Grammar School, Karachi, Pakistan.

Senior Secondary education received at Karachi Grammar School, Karachi, Pakistan and St. Patrick's High School, Karachi, Pakistan.
Senior Secondary Certificate, 1968.

Higher Secondary education received at D. J. Science College, Karachi, Pakistan.
Higher Secondary Certificate, 1970.

University of Karachi, Karachi, Pakistan.
Bachelor of Arts Degree, 1972.

University of Dacca, Dacca, Bangladesh.
Master of Arts Degree (in International Relations), 1974.

Admitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Windsor in 1977, for the degree of Master of Arts, Political Science.

OTHER: Administrative Assistant, School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, 1976-77.

Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, 1977-78.